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Abstract 
 
Does democracy affect basic service delivery? If yes, who benefits, 
and which elements of democracy matter - enfranchisement, the lib-
eralization of political organization, or both? In 1994, 19 million 
South Africans gained the right to vote. The previously banned Afri-
can National Congress was elected promising “a better life for all”. 
Using a difference-in-differences approach, we exploit heterogeneity 
in the share of newly enfranchised voters across municipalities to 
evaluate how franchise extension affected household electrification. 
Our unique dataset combines nightlight satellite imagery, geo-
referenced census data, and municipal election results from the 
1990s. We include covariates, run placebo regressions, and examine 
contiguous census tracts. We find that enfranchisement increased 
electrification. In parts of the country where municipalities lacked 
distribution capacity, the national electricity company prioritized 
core constituencies of the ANC. The effect of democratization on 
basic services depends on the national government’s ability to influ-
ence distribution at the local level. 
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Does democracy affect the delivery of essential basic services? If 
yes, who benefits, and which elements of democracy trigger changes 
in implemented policies – enfranchisement, the liberalization of po-
litical organization, or both? Several studies find that democracies 
are better at providing public services than autocratic regimes (e.g., 
Lake and Baum 2001, Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, Min 2015). 
Franchise extension can shift the median voter in a way that affects 
the size of government and redistribution towards the poor (e.g., 
Meltzer and Richard 1981, Husted and Kenny 1997, Boix 2003, Aidt 
and Eterovic 2011, Aidt and Jensen 2013) and the delivery of ser-
vices benefiting the newly enfranchised (Aidt and Dallal 2008, Mil-
ler 2008, Fujiwara 2013, Vernby 2013). 
However, it is difficult to quantify the direct effect of democratiza-
tion on the lives of the poor. Cross-country comparisons may suffer 
from omitted variable bias, reverse causality, and sample selection 
bias (Ross 2006, Hollyer et al. 2011). Reliance on cross-national data 
of uneven quality gives rise to concerns about measurement error. 
Other studies examine the impact of democracy on resource alloca-
tion rather than services delivered (Stasavage 2005). Yet, especially 
in poor countries, funds are often not spent as intended (Stasavage 
and Moyo 2000, Reinikka and Svensson 2004). An additional chal-
lenge is that the process of democratization typically entails a bundle 
of different changes, including franchise extension as well as the 
lifting of barriers to political activity and organization. Yet, empirical 
work based on standard indices of democracy (Munck and Verkuilen 
2002) leaves unresolved what precisely it is about democracy that 
accounts for the effect of interest. Tackling such “compound treat-
ment” problems requires separating the effects of franchise extension 
and political parties on service delivery.  
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This paper examines electrification in South Africa during the first 
period of democratic local government, which provides a particularly 
good opportunity to evaluate the effect of democracy on service de-
livery. We examine a case of contemporary democratization with 
unique scale: in 1994 suffrage was extended to about 19 million non-
white South Africans, representing 84% of the estimated 22.7 million 
adult citizens and permanent residents who had the right to vote 
(Southall 1994: 639). Restrictions on political activity were lifted and 
all parties were free to compete in elections, including the previously 
banned African National Congress (ANC) led by Nelson Mandela. 
At the same time, backlogs in basic services reflected the apartheid 
era‟s political inequality. Two-thirds of households were estimated to 
lack access to electricity (African National Congress 1994: para. 
2.7.1). Our identification strategy exploits heterogeneity in the share 
of the newly enfranchised population across municipalities. This 
subnational approach helps mitigate several concerns raised above. 
In particular, municipalities within a country are more comparable 
than countries with different historical, cultural, and institutional 
circumstances, which reduces the risk of omitted variable bias.
1 
We 
use an innovative method to combine two sets of census data, the 
most reliable data available to directly measure actual service deliv-
ery outcomes, which in turn we corroborate with nightlight satellite 
imagery. 
Our study extends prior work on the politics of electrification. Brown 
and Mobarak (2009) document a relative shift in the distribution of 
electricity from industry towards households that is associated with 
democratization, but this cross-national work suffers from shortcom-
                                                   
1
 Moreover, our dataset covers the entire territory of the country, so we have no 
sample selection problems. 
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ings including standard identification and compound treatment prob-
lems discussed above. Closely related is the path-breaking work by 
Min (2015) with nighttime lights data. His cross-national results link 
democratic rule to electrification that benefits the poor, while in vil-
lage-level data from India he finds that politicians and parties manip-
ulate electricity supply at crucial moments such as elections. Our 
subnational results on franchise extension are consistent with Min‟s 
cross-national work, and we add robustness by using different data 
sources. However, in contrast to Baskaran et al. (2015) and Min 
(2015: 149), we uncover strong evidence for the targeting of core 
constituencies under particular institutional settings. As we discuss in 
the conclusion, this contributes to a growing debate about context 
conditionality in distributive politics. 
Our estimates show that municipalities with larger shares of newly 
enfranchised voters and thus a clear change in the identity of the me-
dian voter experienced larger improvements in household access to 
electricity in the period 1996-2001. We also show that political 
alignment plays an important mediating role. In areas where the 
state-owned electricity company Eskom carried out electrification, 
ANC core constituencies were prioritized. On the other hand, parti-
san effects are absent in areas where municipalities undertook electri-
fication, suggesting that, at the local level, parties converged on the 
median voter. What matters is not only the ideology of the party in 
power, but its control over the levers of supply. 
1. Enfranchisement, political parties, and electrification 
South Africa‟s “negotiated revolution” (Sparks 1995) culminated in 
democratic elections in April 1994, when for the first time all adult 
South Africans had the right to vote (Mattes 1995). The country‟s 
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mass electrification campaign was inherently linked to the transition 
to democracy, which had fundamental implications for the composi-
tion of the electorate and the party political landscape. In this section, 
we develop our expectations as to how these events affected electri-
fication patterns at the local level. 
Enfranchisement.  Under apartheid, the policy of racial segregation 
implemented by the National Party (NP) during its time in govern-
ment between 1948 and 1994, meaningful political representation 
was reserved for the white population. Out of 22.7 million eligible 
voters in 1994, only 16% belonged to the previously enfranchised 
“white” population, while the remaining 72% “black African”, 9% 
“coloured”2, and 3% “Indian or Asian” adults enjoyed full voting 
rights for the first time (Southall 1994: 637). This population classi-
fication remains in use for census purposes and in public policy de-
bates today, and forms the basis of our analysis. 
Our expectations are grounded in standard median voter theory. 
While under apartheid the median local voter was white and had ac-
cess to electricity, franchise extension meant the median voter be-
came non-white in most municipalities and less likely to have access 
to electricity. According to the 1996 census, 99% of white (and Indi-
an) households were already electrified as opposed to 44% of black 
and 84% of coloured households (Statistics South Africa 2005: 145). 
At the local level, the likelihood that the post-apartheid median voter 
has no electricity is therefore increasing in the share of the non-white 
population. Given apartheid‟s legacy of racial segregation (Christo-
pher 1994: 103-140), non-white households that were already electri-
                                                   
2
 Under apartheid, people regarded to be of mixed descent were classified as “col-
oured” and distinguished from other groups, often with arbitrary rules. The contin-
ued use of the classification is not uncontroversial. 
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fied also benefited from further connections in their community due 
to positive externalities such as improvements in air quality and re-
duced fire risk from paraffin lamps and candles (Department of Min-
erals and Energy 2001: 30). Since it is reasonable to assume that all 
voters desire for themselves and their community to have access to 
electricity, we expect a positive effect of enfranchisement, in particu-
lar of black and coloured voters, on electrification. 
Hypothesis 1: Median voter.  Following the end of apartheid and the 
extension of voting rights to the non-white population, ceteris pari-
bus, municipalities with higher rates of enfranchisement experience 
bigger increases in household access to electricity. 
Party politics.  In a pure median voter framework enfranchisement 
would cause an increase in electrification regardless of which politi-
cal party is in power, as parties compete to please the median voter 
and eventually converge on the same platform (Downs 1957). Alter-
native theories give more careful consideration to the role of political 
parties and, more generally, to the identity of policy-makers (Witt-
man 1983, Besley and Coate 1997). A growing body of empirical 
work investigates whether the identity of the party in power does 
affect public policy, with mixed results. Some studies identify signif-
icant impacts (Pettersson-Lidbom 2008), whilst others find weaker 
(Blais et al. 1993) or no effects (Ferreira and Gyourko 2009).  
South Africa‟s transition to democracy brought fundamental changes 
in party political control. The NP was challenged by the previously 
banned ANC led by Nelson Mandela, who had been released from 
prison. In addition, a range of smaller parties competed for electoral 
support. Among these were the Democratic Party (DP), the official 
opposition to the NP during apartheid, as well as the Zulu-nationalist 
2016/05 
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Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) led by Mangosuthu Buthelezi, a former 
Chief Minister of KwaZulu, a pseudo-independent “homeland” for 
Zulu people.
3
 In 1994, the ANC won 63% of the national vote in the 
first general election after its unbanning, giving it 252 out of 400 
seats in the National Assembly, and a majority of seats in six out of 
nine provincial legislatures (Southall 1994). In 1995 and 1996, mu-
nicipal councils elected under universal suffrage became responsible 
for delivering essential services (Cameron 1996). The ANC won 
about 53% of municipal seats, 6032 out of 11368 (Elections Task 
Group 1996: 230-232). While the party attracted the majority of 
black voters, these elections were not purely determined along racial 
lines (Mattes 1995). In several provinces, dominant population 
groups divided across parties, notably coloured voters in the Western 
Cape and the Northern Cape, as well as the Zulu-speaking population 
in KwaZulu-Natal. Moreover, 40% of councilors were elected using 
proportional representation and the remainder on a ward basis that 
favored local minorities and reduced proportionality (Cameron 1996: 
30-31). It is important to assess whether or not these changes influ-
enced electrification patterns independently of the changes in the 
identity of local median voters. 
Shortly after its unbanning in 1990, the ANC adopted mass electrifi-
cation as a central political goal. Eskom, the country‟s state-owned 
electricity company, and the ANC agreed a set of electrification tar-
gets (Bekker et al. 2008: 3128). These became part of a National 
Electrification Program (NEP) and the ANC‟s manifesto for the 1994 
elections, the Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP). The 
                                                   
3
 “Homelands” or “bantustans” had been reserved for different segments of the 
black population under apartheid, and became synonymous with poverty and un-
derdevelopment (Christopher 1994: 65-101). In 1994, they were dissolved and 
reintegrated into the territory of the Republic of South Africa. 
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ANC promised “electricity for all” and pledged “access to electricity 
for an additional 2.5 million households by the year 2000” (ANC 
1994: para. 2.7.7). This high-level commitment meant that the 
ANC‟s performance would be measured in no small part by whether 
it would be able to achieve this ambitious target.
4
 Since the 1996 
constitution left responsibility for electricity reticulation with local 
authorities, as had been the case prior to democracy, the party‟s man-
ifesto for the municipal elections (“A Better Life: Let‟s Make It 
Happen Where We Live”) highlighted that democratic local councils 
have a crucial role in deciding “where new electricity supplies… will 
be put in” (ANC 1995). In contrast, the DP and NP campaigns em-
phasized crime (Lodge 1999: 44). The IFP had other priorities still, 
in particular the future role of traditional authorities, which provided 
an important power base in its rural strongholds in KwaZulu-Natal 
(Beall et al. 2005). Given the ANC‟s high-level commitment to elec-
trification, the party had the strongest incentives to connect more 
households to the grid. This leads us to the following alternative hy-
potheses: 
Hypothesis 2a: Programmatic parties.  Municipalities with stronger 
ANC representation experience larger increases in electrification 
rates, ceteris paribus. 
Hypothesis 2b: Converging parties.  All political parties converge on 
the preference of the median voter, hence partisan representation on 
local councils does not matter for electrification, ceteris paribus. 
National and local politics.  Hypotheses 2a and 2b are derived under 
the assumption that local authorities are entirely responsible for elec-
                                                   
4
 Progress with electrification is also highly visible, and hence verifiable (Harding 
and Stasavage 2014). 
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trification and can freely allocate resources. Eskom, which had re-
sponsibility for generation and transmission, had substantial excess 
capacity during this period – Bekker et al. (2008: 3126) report a 55% 
reserve margin in 1990. However, not all municipalities had the ca-
pacity to connect households to the grid. Only about a third of mu-
nicipalities had their own electricity distributors, established between 
1888 and 1980, which mainly served urban and adjacent rural areas 
(Department of Minerals and Energy 2001: 5). The NEP thus envis-
aged municipalities to deliver one third of new connections, and 
Eskom the others (Gaunt 2005: 1310). In the mid-1990s, the regula-
tory authorities issued temporary licenses to the pre-existing munici-
pal distributors (National Electricity Regulator 2000: 93). Municipal 
distributors were directly controlled by local governments and sub-
ject to their political direction: councils identified priorities and 
needs, while municipal electricity departments had to clarify tech-
nical requirements, seek funding from the council, and plan imple-
mentation (Qase et al. 2001). This facilitated local accountability, as 
“elected councillors who are part of the local authority structure pro-
vide a channel whereby user needs are communicated to the munici-
palities‟ electricity departments, and municipal issues are communi-
cated to households” (Department of Minerals and Energy 2001: 10). 
In parts of the country without effective municipal distribution, 
Eskom took on the task of electrification and direct distribution to 
households, especially in former “homelands” and rural areas. The 
company had to rely on internal financing, so it had incentives to 
prioritize areas where potential consumption was high and that could 
be electrified cheaply, which depends on factors such as distance 
from the grid, settlement density, as well as topographical conditions 
(Dinkelman 2011: 3084). In addition, Eskom faced political pres-
sures. Its senior managers had incentives to please the ANC in order 
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to delay a restructuring of the electricity industry and increased com-
petition (Department of Minerals and Energy 1998, Gaunt 2005: 
1315). Moreover, successive governments had used their role in the 
appointment of senior management to ensure that Eskom‟s key poli-
cies and objectives served “the interests of key constituencies behind 
the political party in power” (Davis and Steyn 1998: 68). Although 
formally the selection of electrification projects was internal to 
Eskom, the company‟s main accountability relationship was thus 
with the national government, led by the ANC, and it was likely to 
have to deliver to the party‟s “key constituencies”. Unlike municipal 
distributors, Eskom was “not directly accountable to customers” and 
put less emphasis on community involvement (Department of Miner-
als and Energy 2001: 14). 
The distributive politics literature offers theoretical reasons to expect 
central government interference with the geographical allocation of 
resources. For example, Cox and McCubbins (1986) argue that ideo-
logical similarities induce incumbent governments to allocate more 
resources to core support groups and therefore to areas where they 
have greater electoral support. Targeting co-partisan voters can in-
crease chances of re-election also because parties may have better 
knowledge of their supporters‟ preferences (Dixit and Londregan 
1996). National leaders may favor areas controlled by members of 
the same party also to increase the chances of re-election of co-
partisan local politicians (McCarty 2000). These theories stand in 
contrast with the “swing voter” hypothesis, which predicts that pub-
lic resources are disproportionately allocated to centrist voters since 
all parties try to capture the center of the political spectrum.
5
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 The swing voter hypothesis is derived from probabilistic voting models (see 
Lindbeck and Weibull 1987 and 1993). Although in these models platform conver-
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This discussion leads us to anticipate different partisan effects on 
electrification depending on whether distribution was in the hands of 
Eskom or local authorities. In the latter case, the link to the political 
alignment of the local council and its administration is through repre-
sentation. We examine such representation effects, reflected in hy-
potheses 2a and 2b, in the municipal distribution subsample. Howev-
er, partisan effects in Eskom distribution areas could be rather differ-
ent. Since Eskom was at least indirectly subject to pressure from the 
dominant party at the central government level, its selection of elec-
trification projects could be used to target specific municipalities and 
voters. The ANC had been elected on an ambitious program of elec-
trification, so we have reason to assume that Eskom would prioritize 
the party‟s core constituencies, disrupting local accountability chan-
nels: 
Hypothesis 3: Core constituencies.  In municipalities where Eskom 
distributes electricity directly, the positive effect of enfranchisement 
on household electrification is amplified if a municipality is a core 
constituency of the ANC, ceteris paribus. 
2. Variables and data 
The empirical analysis is based on a dataset of 799 municipalities 
located in nine provinces (see Figure B1 in the appendix). We used 
Statistics South Africa‟s Community Profiles and GIS databases to 
generate a unique dataset that aligns 2001 census results with 1996 
                                                                                                                     
gence may not happen exactly at the median, the swing voter hypothesis implies a 
centrist tendency similar to the median voter theorem. Evidence in support of the 
“core voters” model includes Case (2001) on Albania, Miguel and Zaidi (2003) on 
Ghana, and Larcinese et al. (2006) on the US. Other empirical work (e.g., Dahlberg 
and Johansson 2002, Kwon 2005, Banful 2010, Casey 2013) is consistent with 
competing models where “swing voters” get priority. 
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municipal data for the first time. Prior studies of service delivery in 
South Africa have often resorted to coarser data on just nine provinc-
es, since their boundaries have been more stable (Statistics South 
Africa 2005). Shortly before the 2001 census, a new local govern-
ment structure with 262 municipalities replaced the one that existed 
at the time of the 1996 census. To make data from 1996 and 2001 
comparable, we took advantage of their spatial attributes and aggre-
gated information on 21,243 enumeration units or census tracts from 
the 2001 census up to the level of 1996 municipal boundaries.
6
 Fur-
ther details are in the data appendix. One contribution of this paper is 
the resulting longitudinal dataset, covering South Africa‟s entire ge-
ographic extent over two census waves, which creates new opportu-
nities to study electoral and socio-demographic outcomes at the mu-
nicipal level during this crucial period in the country‟s history. 
Dependent variables.  Our main dependent variable Electricityit is 
based on census information and measures the percentage share of 
households with access to electricity in municipality i at time t. A full 
description is in the data appendix. Most municipalities had substan-
tial numbers of households that were not connected to the grid. Ac-
cording to the 1996 census, merely seven municipalities had univer-
sal access, while half had household electrification rates of 70% or 
lower. Sizable improvements were possible in the vast majority of 
municipalities. Map 1 in Figure 1 visualizes changes in Electricity 
between 1996 and 2001. 
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 Our 2001 municipal boundaries are thus “virtual boundaries” that enable us to 
measure local progress with electrification by 2001. Political decisions taken by 
councils elected in 1995/6 directly affected areas belonging to a municipality de-
fined according to 1996 boundaries. Hence, reporting 2001 outcomes within 1996 
boundaries is the correct procedure if we want to evaluate the impact of the 1995/6 
elections. 
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[Figure 1 about here] 
We use Nightlightit as an alternative dependent variable, which is 
calculated using satellite images of the earth at night for the years 
1992, 1996, and 2001. Figure 2 visualizes how we transform these 
data: we first use the raw nighttime lights images (Map 1) to classify 
each of the over one million pixels as either “lit” or “unlit” (Map 2). 
This binary classification ensures that non-linearity of luminosity in 
the images is “no longer a concern” (Michalopoulos and Papaioan-
nou 2013: 135) and addresses problems with comparability over time 
(Chen and Nordhaus 2010, Elvidge et al. 2013). We then calculate 
the percentage share of lit pixels within the 1996 municipal bounda-
ries to yield information on local electrification levels (Map 3) as 
well as the change between 1996-2001 (Map 4). The data appendix 
contains a full discussion, and explains why alternative population-
adjusted methodologies (see Elvidge et al. 2010) are unsuitable in 
our case. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
The correlation between Nightlight and Electricity (in levels) for the 
years 1996 and 2001 is .47. This is broadly consistent with other 
comparisons of nighttime lights to national electricity data (e.g., Elv-
idge et al. 2001, Min et al. 2013).
7
 In the absence of stable outdoor 
lighting, pixels appear unlit even where households have access to 
electricity. This matters in our context, since street lighting was “of-
ten not provided” when households were connected to the grid (De-
partment of Minerals and Energy 2001: viii). Outdoor lighting can 
                                                   
7
 Nighttime lights have been used to study electoral effects on electricity provision 
(Min 2015), and as a proxy for economic activity (Henderson et al. 2012, Sto-
reygard 2012, Pinkovskiy 2011), regional development (Michalopoulos and Papai-
oannou 2013), and spatial inequality (Alesina et al. 2012). 
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also be too dim to be detected (Elvidge et al. 2009). Moreover, 
Nightlight captures light from uninhabited industrial sites and high-
ways. South Africa‟s mines and main highways are clearly visible 
from outer space. In areas around Johannesburg and Cape Town we 
also observe the overglow effect, due to the tendency of light “to 
travel to pixels outside of those in which it originates, and light tends 
to be magnified over certain terrain types such as water and snow 
cover” (Pinkovskiy 2011: 9). The quality of South Africa‟s official 
statistics is recognized as uniquely high on the continent (Jerven 
2013: 101). Hence, for our purposes, the census is the ideal data 
source, as it directly and reliably captures household access to elec-
tricity. We use the satellite data to assess the robustness of our results 
and to analyze years without census data. 
Independent variable.  The main independent variable Enfranchisedi 
refers to newly (post-apartheid) enfranchised voters: it is the percent-
age of citizens of voting age who are non-white in municipality i in 
1996. The census also allows us to break down this variable into sep-
arate groups of newly enfranchised voters categorized as black, col-
oured, and Indian (or Asian). Map 2 in Figure 1 shows the share of 
all newly enfranchised voters across municipalities. As noted in the 
discussion of Hypothesis 1, black voters constitute the most deprived 
subset of the non-white population, and their share of the electorate 
is depicted in Map 3. 
Control variables.  To address concerns that Enfranchised is corre-
lated with other variables that are in turn correlated with trends in 
Electricity, we include several control variables.
8
 As discussed in the 
                                                   
8
 To avoid “post-treatment bias” (King 2010), we do not include “bad controls” 
(Angrist and Pischke 2009: 64) that are themselves potential outcomes of Enfran-
chised, such as changes in other public services. 
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previous section, we include geographic covariates that affect the 
supply of electricity: the distance to the electricity grid in 1996, the 
distance to the closest main road in 1996, the average slope, and ele-
vation. We control for the demand for electricity with socioeconomic 
variables relating to education and income, demographic variables 
such as population density and the total number of households, as 
well as the number of non-electrified households in 1996.
9
 Finally, 
our regressions also include province fixed effects. As the dependent 
variable is a difference, they capture province-specific shocks and 
absorb fixed spatial autocorrelation. Given space constraints, we re-
port summary statistics in the appendix (Tables B1 and B2). 
3. Empirical strategy 
In an ideal setting, we would like to compare our data with a counter-
factual scenario in which democratization did not occur. Since we 
cannot observe this counterfactual we exploit the heterogeneity in 
enfranchisement in the first democratic elections across South Afri-
can municipalities.
10
 We determine the effect of enfranchisement on 
electrification by using a difference-in-differences specification, 
where the shares of newly enfranchised represent the intensity of 
treatment across municipalities. Using the variables defined in the 
previous section, our model can be expressed as follows, with i in-
dexing a given municipality: 
                                                   
9
 Recall that the NEP stated targets in terms of the number of households to be 
electrified. Moreover, we include the number of non-electrified households in a 
specification that already controls for total population levels, which helps to purge 
our results from the electrification needs of the various municipalities. 
10
 This is a well-established methodology. See for example Berlinski and Dewan 
(2011) and Vernby (2013). 
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ΔElectricityi1996-2001 = α + βEnfranchisedi1996 + γControlsi1996 
+ Δεi1996-2001         (1) 
Using a specification in changes rather than levels purges our regres-
sions of omitted unobservables that are fixed over time. However, we 
remain concerned about changing characteristics of municipalities 
that could be correlated with changes in electrification via Enfran-
chised. Our main identifying assumption is that, conditional on the 
observables we control for, Enfranchised is uncorrelated with the 
error term.  
A paramount concern is that electrification in areas with high enfran-
chisement could be due to some underlying growth in electrification 
that occurs regardless of regime type. First, municipalities with high 
electrification rates in 1996 have little margins for further electrifica-
tion and this could mechanically generate a correlation between en-
franchisement and electrification since low-electrification areas are 
also predominantly inhabited by non-whites. Second, our estimates 
could reflect pre-democratization trends in electrification if predomi-
nantly non-white municipalities are electrifying faster and “catching 
up” already in the pre-democracy era. Our empirical analysis consid-
ers these confounding hypotheses. In particular, we analyze pre-
existing trends with placebo regressions to rule out as far as possible 
that our results are driven by a violation of the parallel trends as-
sumption (Angrist and Pischke 2009: 227-243). Placebo regressions 
check whether our main explanatory variable accounts for electrifica-
tion in the pre-democratization era. If enfranchisement has no ex-
planatory power before it actually occurs, this would provide evi-
dence against a catching up effect that is unrelated to democratiza-
tion, since it is not obvious that such an effect should only emerge 
after the first democratic elections. We further corroborate our find-
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ings by examining contiguous census tracts and carry out other ro-
bustness checks, which we discuss in the following section. 
4. Main Results 
4.1 Baseline estimates 
Table 1 reports our baseline estimates, using the census-based meas-
ure of access to electricity as the dependent variable and the share of 
newly enfranchised voters as the main explanatory variable. We re-
port results from several specifications, starting with a simple regres-
sion (column 1) and progressively including province-specific shocks 
(column 2), geographic controls (column 3), population and socioec-
onomic controls at their 1996 levels (column 4), and the number of 
non-electrified households in 1996 (column 5).
11
 We then include 
1996-2001 differences in population and socioeconomic controls 
(column 6).
12
  
The coefficient of interest is positive and statistically significant 
throughout. We can safely conclude that the share of newly enfran-
chised (non-white) voters has a positive and statistically significant 
effect on household electrification rates, as stated in Hypothesis 1. 
The magnitude of the coefficients ranges from .19 to .34. These rep-
resent the effect of an increase in the share of newly enfranchised 
voters by one percentage point. The lower bound suggests that one 
                                                   
11
 We report the coefficients on the province fixed effects from column 5 in the 
appendix (Figure B2). Three of these are negative and significant: KwaZulu-Natal, 
Northern Cape, and Western Cape – the three regions in which the ANC faced its 
strongest electoral challenges from opposition parties. This presages the party 
political story that we unpack in the following section. 
12
 This introduces the possibility of post-treatment bias (Angrist and Pischke 2009: 
64, King 2010), but failing to control for these differences may also result in bias. 
The fact that these controls do not alter the pattern of results is reassuring. 
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standard deviation in enfranchisement led to an increase in electrifi-
cation of at least 3.5 percentage points, more than one third of the 
sample mean: a substantively large effect.  
[Table 1 about here] 
In column 7 we distinguish between newly enfranchised black, col-
oured, and Indian voters. The effect is particularly strong for black 
voters, positive but less strong for coloured voters, and statistically 
insignificant for Indian voters. The coefficients indicate that an in-
crease of one standard deviation in the share of black voters led to an 
increase of 12 percentage points in the household electrification rate, 
and about half that size for coloured voters. 
4.2 Placebo regressions 
The most important identification concern is that our estimates could 
capture a pre-existing trend associated with Enfranchised that occurs 
regardless of regime type. To rule this out, we follow the standard 
procedure and check whether enfranchisement can explain electrifi-
cation before democratization (when it should not). Comparable in-
formation for the period prior to 1996 does not exist, as apartheid-era 
census data from the early 1990s are incomplete.
13
 For this reason we 
use Nightlight as an alternative dependent variable. This has two 
important advantages. First, Nightlight is based on an entirely inde-
pendent data source with complete records covering all of South Af-
rica. As such, the images function as an additional source of data that 
we use to corroborate our findings. Second, the satellite images are 
publicly available as annual composites from 1992, so they provide 
                                                   
13
 The 1991 census excludes some homeland areas and lacks information on 
household access to electricity. 
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information about electrification in the years prior to democratiza-
tion. 
Panel (a) in Table 2 replicates the models in Table 1 using changes in 
the share of lit pixels during 1996-2001 as the dependent variable. 
The coefficients of interest are statistically significant and stable 
across specifications, but magnitudes are smaller than with census 
data: the estimated effect of an increase in the share of newly enfran-
chised voters by one percentage point ranges from .06 to .09. One 
standard deviation in the share of non-white voters leads to a maxi-
mum 1.7 percentage point increase in Nightlight. It is reassuring that 
the estimated effects of enfranchisement relative to mean changes in 
electrification are similar across models using census and satellite 
data. 
[Table 2 about here] 
In panel (b) of Table 2 we report our placebo regressions. Here, we 
replace the dependent variable with changes in the share of lit pixels 
during 1992-1996. All coefficients on Enfranchised are far from ac-
ceptable significance levels. We also experimented with a range of 
alternative nightlight-based variables used in the literature, notably 
population-adjusted measures discussed in the data appendix. The 
overall pattern is highly robust, with significant enfranchisement 
effects for the period 1996-2001 and insignificant effects for 1992-
1996. Despite the limitations of the satellite data, these results 
strongly suggest that what we capture with our estimates is unlikely 
to be due to pre-existing electrification trends. 
4.3. Examining contiguous census tracts from different mu-
nicipalities  
LIEPP Working Paper n° 53 
21 
The need for electrification at the municipal level is highly correlated 
with enfranchisement, both being correlated with the non-white pop-
ulation share at the time of democratization. In this section we fur-
ther corroborate our results by using an alternative empirical strategy 
based on spatial discontinuity. We use more fine-grained data at the 
census tract (CT) level
14
 and match adjacent CTs that lie on different 
sides of a municipal boundary, thus restricting the sample to CTs that 
lie on municipal borders only.
15
 Including a fixed effect for each pair 
of neighbouring CTs means that identification is obtained by match-
ing CTs that belong to different municipalities (hence treated with 
differential levels of enfranchisement), but that are adjacent (hence 
generally similar in other respects).
16
 
By using this strategy we take into account several confounding fac-
tors. First, it is less likely that economic and social conditions vary 
discontinuously along municipal borders, which makes comparisons 
more reliable. Second, electricity needs and socioeconomic condi-
tions may be specific to a CT, especially with segregated communi-
ties that are typical for South African municipalities (Christopher 
1994: 103-140). The relevant decision-making unit, however, is not 
the CT but the municipality. As a result, municipal-level enfran-
chisement should now better capture the effect of democratization, 
since we can separate its impact on the decision-making unit (via the 
                                                   
14
 Our census tract dataset combines 1996 “placename” level data with 2001 “sub-
place” level data following the same approach as for our municipality dataset, as 
explained in detail in the data appendix. 
15
 This strategy draws on Holmes (1998), as extended by Dube et al. (2010) and 
Duranton et al. (2011). 
16
 A CT bordering more than one CT of an adjacent municipality enters multiple 
times into the sample, each time with a separate pair fixed effect. To correct for the 
resulting correlations across pairs on the same municipality boundary, we use two-
way clustering (Cameron et al. 2011), by municipality and by each border between 
municipalities. 
2016/05 
22 
overall share of newly enfranchised in a municipality) from a “catch-
ing up” effect that is unrelated to it (as reflected in the electrification 
need of a specific CT). By differentiating census tract and municipal-
ity we thus break a correlation that can represent an important con-
founding factor. We estimate the following equation, which omits the 
years from subscripts: 
ΔElectricitycpi = αp + βEnfranchisedi + γControlsc + Δεcpi         (2) 
As before, i indicates a municipality, while c indicates a CT and p 
indicates a pair of adjacent CTs that lie across a municipal boundary. 
Controls are now at the CT level, but Enfranchised remains at the 
municipal level. Results are reported in Table 3 and are in line with 
those obtained with our main specification. The coefficient on En-
franchised is always statistically significant at the 1% level and rang-
es from .16 to .26, slightly lower than what we obtained previously.
17
 
When we distinguish different non-white groups, the effect of black 
enfranchisement remains positive, statistically significant, and with a 
magnitude close to that in Table 1. The effects for coloured and Indi-
an voters become statistically insignificant and significant respective-
ly: these are the only relevant differences compared to our main 
specification. Overall, our results are robust to this demanding speci-
fication. 
[Table 3 about here] 
4.4. Other robustness checks  
As noted earlier, another concern is that our dependent variable has 
an upper bound of 100. Areas that were highly electrified in the pre-
                                                   
17
 This is not surprising given that the sample is also different. 
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treatment period have lower margins to improve and, since pre-
treatment electrification levels are not orthogonal to enfranchise-
ment, this may bias the coefficients of interest. We repeated our ex-
ercise with a restricted sample, excluding municipalities where more 
than 90% of the population had access to electricity in 1996, using 
the same specification as in column 5 of Table 1. The coefficient on 
Enfranchised is twice as large as in the full sample, and it gets larger 
as we further reduce this threshold. Electrification gains were lower 
in areas with very high levels of household access to electricity in 
1996, but the basic pattern is robust. These results appear in appendix 
Table B3, panel (a). Further robustness checks reported in appendix 
Table B4, panel (a), show that our main results go through when we 
exclude, in turn, the municipalities that fall into any one of the nine 
provinces: the relationship we document is not limited to any particu-
lar region of the country. 
5. The role of political parties 
We now return to the important question of how party politics affect-
ed electrification during this period. In principle, municipal distribu-
tors should be responsive to changes in the local median voter. In 
discussing our hypotheses, we noted that party politics can display its 
effects at two levels. First, local ANC politicians could have particu-
lar incentives to electrify households, as stated in Hypothesis 2a. 
Second, electricity distribution could be part of a national strategy. 
As stated in Hypothesis 3, we expect that in municipalities where 
Eskom distributes electricity directly, the positive effect of enfran-
chisement on household electrification is amplified if the municipali-
ty is a core constituency of the ANC.  
2016/05 
24 
We use 1996 membership data from the Association of Municipal 
Electricity Undertakings (AMEU) to distinguish municipalities 
served by Eskom from municipalities served by a local distributor. 
The data appendix contains a detailed description. Our statistical 
analysis relies on the variable ANC seat sharei, the share of total 
seats on local council i won by the ANC in the 1995/6 elections 
(Elections Task Group 1996). This was the first time following its 
unbanning that the ANC was able to freely contest municipal elec-
tions.
18
 Hence, the share of seats obtained in those elections at the 
same time represents the change in the share of ANC seats from zero 
prior to democracy. Map 4 in Figure 1 shows the geographic distri-
bution, with spatial clusters of councils dominated by the ANC in the 
Eastern Cape, North West, Mpumalanga, and Limpopo (initially 
called Northern Transvaal and then Northern Province). These prov-
inces contain ANC core constituencies and coincide with areas that 
experienced large changes in electrification as depicted in Map 1. 
To test our hypotheses, we first check whether enfranchisement is 
merely a proxy for the changed landscape in municipal representa-
tion or, put differently, if the impact of democratization on electrifi-
cation is channeled via municipal representation of the ANC. We 
augment our model with the ANC seat share variable, which has a 
correlation of .49 with our measure of enfranchisement. Column (1) 
of Table 4 shows that the ANC‟s seat share had no direct effect on 
electrification, while the coefficient on Enfranchised remains posi-
tive and statically significant. This suggests the latter is not merely a 
proxy for ANC representation. Only when we exclude Enfranchised 
is the effect of ANC representation statistically significant (column 
                                                   
18
 This fact reduces concerns about the endogeneity of voting returns (Larcinese et 
al. 2013). 
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2). We also find no evidence of a direct effect of ANC seat share in 
either Eskom (column 3) or municipal distribution (column 4) are-
as.
19
 This evidence is compatible with Hypothesis 2b (converging 
parties) and suggests that we should reject Hypothesis 2a (program-
matic parties).  
If not via municipal representation, another possibility is that the 
impact of enfranchisement itself differed as a function of ANC 
strength. To test this, we augment our model with an interaction be-
tween Enfranchised and ANC seat share. We report results for the 
full sample (column 5) and separately for municipalities supplied by 
Eskom (column 6) and municipal distributors (column 7).
20
 The co-
efficient on the interaction term is positive and significant only in the 
full sample and the Eskom subsample. The magnitude of the coeffi-
cient is larger in the latter case. In sum, we find support for Hypothe-
sis 3 (core constituencies). 
To probe the precise nature of the partisan effect, we construct sepa-
rate dummies for each quarter of ANC seat share. We then use these 
dummies and their interactions with enfranchisement in our regres-
sions (the first quarter, 0-25%, is the reference category), replacing 
the continuous seat share measure and its interaction. The results in 
columns (8) to (10) and summarized in Figure 3 reveal important 
nuances. First, the 50% threshold does not matter; the conditional 
coefficients for the second and third quarters are not statistically dis-
tinguishable. Second, F-tests indicate that in Eskom-served munici-
palities the marginal effect of franchise extension when the party 
                                                   
19
 The coefficient on Enfranchised in column 4 falls just short of significance at 
standard levels, but the pattern of results is as in column 3. Sample size is smaller 
than for the Eskom subsample. 
20
 When we replaced the ANC‟s seat share with NP or IFP seat shares, the results 
convey the story inversely. See Figure B3 in the appendix. 
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controls 75% of seats or more is statistically different from the other 
conditional coefficients. If it simply were the case that the coordina-
tion between a non-ANC council and Eskom was more difficult, then 
it should matter whether the ANC had a majority or not, irrespective 
of its size, but this is not the pattern we detect. For councils with mu-
nicipal distributors, the effect of enfranchisement is larger in the 
three highest quarters of ANC representation than in the reference 
category, but the differences are small and statistically insignificant. 
[Table 4 about here]   [Figure 3 about here] 
We also conduct a formal test of whether the corresponding coeffi-
cients depicted in panels (b) and (c) of Figure 3 are statistically dif-
ferent. Using the full sample, we estimate a model with a three-way 
interaction of enfranchisement, the seat share quarter dummies, and 
an indicator of whether a municipality is supplied directly by Eskom. 
The coefficient on the interaction between Enfranchised, ANC seat 
share Q4, and the Eskom indicator is .801 (the difference between 
.967 and 0.166 in columns 9 and 10 of Table 4), with a standard error 
of .248 (p = .001).
21
 For all other seat share quarters, the correspond-
ing differences between the two subsamples are not statistically dis-
tinguishable. In other words, Eskom delivered a significant top-up to 
core constituencies of the ANC, as predicted by Hypothesis 3. Panels 
(b) of Tables B3 and B4 in the appendix repeat earlier supplementary 
robustness checks that yield consistent results.  
                                                   
21
 To recover the precise coefficients reported in columns 9 and 10 of Table 4, we 
follow Kam and Franzese (2007: 103-111) and estimate a “fully dummy-
interactive” model that also includes interactions of all other covariates, including 
the constant, with the Eskom indicator. The results reported here are substantively 
the same whether we do this or not. 
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In sum, we detect two distinct patterns of service delivery, depending 
on institutional responsibility for electrification. In municipal distri-
bution areas, the partisan composition of local councils does not con-
dition the effect of enfranchisement. Local decision-making appears 
consistent with party convergence predicted by standard models of 
electoral competition (Downs 1957). The results for Eskom distribu-
tion areas, on the other hand, point to a strong role for partisan influ-
ences compatible with core-voter models of distributive politics (e.g., 
Cox and McCubbins 1986). Here, the pattern of results is in line with 
our expectation that the dominant party in the national government, 
via Eskom, rewarded its “key constituencies”, as predicted by Davis 
and Steyn (1998: 68). Since Eskom was responsible for two-thirds of 
the electrification target under the NEP, this effect dominates in the 
full sample. 
6. Conclusions 
Enfranchisement shifted the median voter and led to increased 
household electrification rates during the first period of democratic 
local government in South Africa. For the years 1996-2001, we esti-
mate an average increase in the share of municipal households with 
electricity access of between 3 and 6 percentage points per standard 
deviation of enfranchisement. Taking the most conservative lower 
bound estimate from our main results, the average share of newly 
enfranchised voters in the municipal electorate, 82%, implies an in-
crease in the share of electrified households by 16 percentage points. 
The effect is largest in municipalities with higher shares of black 
voters, who had the greatest electrification backlog. Our analysis also 
shows how party politics mediated the effect of enfranchisement. 
ANC core constituencies supplied by Eskom saw the largest gains. 
However, the partisan composition of the local council made no dif-
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ference in areas with municipal distributors. This suggests that the 
median voter logic is strong enough to drive even a party such as the 
NP – which had previously denied voting rights to the non-white 
population – to expand services to the newly enfranchised. Hence, 
the effect of democratization on basic services depends on the na-
tional government‟s ability to influence distribution at the local level. 
These results extend the literature on democracy and public service 
delivery.
22
 Compared with existing literature, our analysis establishes 
analytically separate effects of franchise extension and changes in 
partisan representation: not only does it matter that more people re-
ceive the right to vote but, depending on institutional responsibility 
for delivery, it also matters which party they vote for. This is a valu-
able first step in addressing the “compound treatment” problem in 
cross-national work on this topic, although we acknowledge that 
there are other dimensions of democratization that we leave unex-
plored.
23
 Moreover, by directly measuring service delivery outcomes 
(using two independent data sources) our analysis focuses on the 
ultimate outcome of interest: whether people‟s lives were actually 
affected. This is essential for assessing the implications of democra-
                                                   
22
 In addition to work cited earlier, Martinez-Bravo et al. (2012) and Zhang et al. 
(2004) show that the introduction of local elections in Chinese municipalities led to 
an increase in public good provision. Skoufias et al. (2014) study the impact of 
direct elections in Indonesian municipalities. Olken (2010) provides experimental 
evidence that participatory, rather than representative, democracy in Indonesian 
villages led to higher voter satisfaction with development projects. The respon-
siveness of elected leaders also depends on the circulation of newspapers and, 
more generally, an informed electorate (Besley and Burgess 2002). 
23
 One important dimension is the protection of individual rights. After 1994, and 
especially after the adoption of a new constitution in 1996, the non-white popula-
tion could use new freedoms and increased protection of their personal rights to 
form interest groups and put pressure on administrations and providers. Non-
electoral channels are outside the scope of our work but we acknowledge that they 
might have played a role in shaping patterns of electrification. 
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cy for the poor in contexts where resource allocation is a limited in-
dicator for actual service delivery, as in many developing countries. 
We also add to prior work on the politics of electricity. Consistent 
with Min (2015), we find that democracy improves access to electric-
ity, and our data allows us to pinpoint impacts on households direct-
ly. However, our evidence in favor of the core voter hypothesis con-
trasts with findings by Baskaran et al. (2015) and Min (2015) on In-
dia. It is likely that partisan effects in established democracies are 
different from those in new ones (Keefer 2007). Our focus is on a 
large-scale and sustained electrification effort immediately after de-
mocratization, whereas the short-term cycles that Min documents 
occur in a more settled political context. While the ANC‟s domi-
nance during this period made its immediate electoral outlook fairly 
certain (Southall 1994), the party was challenged to demonstrate to 
its supporters that it was capable to deliver “a better life for all” in-
cluding the concrete improvements it had promised. Follow-up work 
could examine more recent electricity supply patterns in South Afri-
ca, which might be more comparable to the Indian experience also in 
other respects.
24
 More broadly, these contrasting results add to a 
growing debate about the contextual conditions under which differ-
ent voters or constituencies are targeted (e.g. Weitz-Shapiro 2012, 
Diaz-Cayeros et al. 2016). 
Our results also contribute to a debate on South African politics 
about whether the ANC “punished” voters that did not vote for it. 
Ferree (2011: 15) cites delivery patterns for housing and social grants 
                                                   
24
 Electricity access in South Africa continued to improve in later years, but dis-
connections due to non-payment also increased (Fjeldstad 2004). More recent 
electricity blackouts reflect under-investment in generation capacity and poor 
planning (Johnson 2009: 473-481). 
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across the nine provinces to argue that there is “no evidence of a pun-
ishment scheme” but cautions that “more careful examination of less 
aggregated data could produce different conclusions”. Indeed, the 
electrification patterns we document at the municipal level show pre-
cisely such a politicization of service delivery. While we do not find 
that the ANC “punished” voters that supported other parties, we 
show that parts of the country with newly enfranchised voters that 
overwhelmingly voted for the ANC benefited more than others, but 
depending on municipal capacity for electrification. This also implies 
that opposition support tended to be more costly in rural areas and 
former homelands, which were less likely to have municipal distribu-
tion capacity. These subtle differences are only revealed by a dis-
aggregated analysis that we provide, which contributes an important 
piece of new evidence that helps to clarify this debate. 
How generalizable are our results? On the one hand, the South Afri-
can context is unusual in that the conditions for a rapid rollout of 
electricity existed at the time of the transition to democracy. Electric-
ity generation was initially not an obstacle to expansion. Post-
democratization electrification gains might be less impressive in 
countries with low reserve margins. Nonetheless, we have reasons to 
believe that the patterns we document are not peculiar to the case we 
study. Recent work on enfranchisement in very different geographic 
and historical contexts (e.g., Miller 2008, Vernby 2013) yields com-
patible results. Related work on how democracy affects health out-
comes in Sub-Saharan Africa also suggests that the basic pattern we 
document applies to other services (Kudamatsu 2012).
25
 There is 
scope to expand both the set of countries and the type of policies that 
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 Kramon and Posner (2013) argue for more systematic comparisons across differ-
ent goods. We plan further work on housing and water to enable us to explore 
trade-offs across several outcomes. 
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are investigated, and with a greater focus on the role of partisan poli-
tics and the degree of decentralization in service delivery that we 
identify as central in our study. 
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Table 1: The impact of enfranchisement on electrification 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Enfranchised 0.343*** 0.280*** 0.293*** 0.232*** 0.191*** 0.277***  
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.041) (0.040) (0.040)  
Enfranchised black       0.327*** 
       (0.041) 
Enfranchised coloured       0.204*** 
       (0.047) 
Enfranchised Indian       -0.022 
       (0.059) 
Constant -19.058*** -11.056*** -6.992* -5.269 -2.204 -12.815*** -13.817*** 
 (2.534) (3.001) (3.619) (4.399) (4.328) (4.757) (4.565) 
Province fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Geographic controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Population and socioeconomic controls (1996) No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Households without electricity (1996) No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Population and socioeconomic controls  
(1996-2001 diff.) 
No No No No No Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.111 0.161 0.173 0.192 0.245 0.307 0.325 
Note: The dependent variable is the percentage share of households with electricity for lighting (difference 1996-
2001) calculated from census data. Geographic controls are: (1) Distance from electricity grid; (2) Distance from main 
road; (3) Elevation; (4) Slope. Population controls are: (1) Population density; (2) Number of households. Socioeco-
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nomic controls are: (1) Share of population with no schooling; (2) Median income; (3) Share of labor force with low 
income (due to differences in the underlying variables in the 2001 census, this variable is only included as a 1996 lev-
el control and not as a 1996-2001 difference). Refer to the data appendix for full details. N = 799. OLS estimates with 
robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Table 2: Replication with satellite data and test for pre-existing trends 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
a. Dependent variable: ΔNightlight 1996-2001        
Enfranchised 0.064*** 0.063*** 0.066*** 0.092*** 0.088** 0.080**  
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.025) (0.034) (0.035) (0.037)  
Enfranchised black       0.109*** 
       (0.038) 
Enfranchised coloured       0.041 
       (0.044) 
Enfranchised Indian       0.015 
       (0.049) 
b. Dependent variable: ΔNightlight 1992-1996        
Enfranchised 0.068 0.029 0.037 0.047 0.059 -0.006  
 (0.052) (0.059) (0.056) (0.063) (0.064) (0.070)  
Enfranchised black       0.007 
       (0.072) 
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Enfranchised coloured       -0.026 
       (0.078) 
Enfranchised Indian       -0.078 
       (0.082) 
Province fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Geographic controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Population and socioeconomic controls (1996) No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Households without electricity (1996) No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Population and socioeconomic controls (1996-2001 diff.) No No No No No Yes Yes 
Note: The dependent variable is the percentage share of lit pixels (difference 1996-2001 and 1992-1996, respectively) 
calculated from satellite data. All regressions also include a constant. Refer to Table 1 for a description of control varia-
bles, and the data appendix for full details. N = 799. OLS estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 3: Matching contiguous census tracts from different municipalities 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Enfranchised 0.264*** 0.254*** 0.248*** 0.181*** 0.160*** 0.184***  
 (0.052) (0.057) (0.056) (0.056) (0.055) (0.056)  
Enfranchised black               0.250*** 
       (0.064) 
Enfranchised coloured       -0.023 
       (0.081) 
Enfranchised Indian       0.187** 
       (0.075) 
Contiguous CT pair fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Geographic controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Population and socioeconomic controls (1996) No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Households without electricity (1996) No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Population and socioeconomic controls (1996-2001 diff.) No No No No No Yes Yes 
R-squared (overall) 0.083 0.060 0.034 0.071 0.080 0.086 0.100 
R-squared (within) 0.015 0.017 0.024 0.066 0.080 0.087 0.093 
Note: The dependent variable is the percentage share of households with electricity for lighting (difference 1996-2001) calculated from 
census data. Refer to Table 1 for a description of control variables, and the data appendix for full details. All variables are calculated at 
the CT level, except Enfranchised and Enfranchised black/coloured/Indian, which are calculated at the municipality level. N = 7530. 
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OLS estimates with standard errors in parentheses, double clustered (see Cameron et al. 2011) at the municipality and border levels. 
There are 688 clusters for municipalities and 1171 for borders. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 4: The role of the ANC’s seat share on local councils  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Enfranchised 0.194***  0.210*** 0.133 0.053 0.046 0.080 0.080* 0.070 0.017 
 (0.043)  (0.050) (0.092) (0.044) (0.048) (0.138) (0.044) (0.048) (0.162) 
ANC seat share -0.005 0.050** -0.005 -0.014 -0.370*** -0.547*** -0.096    
 (0.026) (0.025) (0.032) (0.049) (0.086) (0.111) (0.143)    
Enfranchised  ANC seat share     0.004*** 0.006*** 0.001    
     (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)    
Enfranchised  ANC seat share Q2        0.125 0.150 0.152 
        (0.083) (0.106) (0.188) 
Enfranchised  ANC seat share Q3        0.165* 0.270** 0.007 
        (0.087) (0.105) (0.195) 
Enfranchised  ANC seat share Q4        0.511*** 0.967*** 0.166 
        (0.159) (0.167) (0.185) 
ANC seat share Q2        -12.401** -15.432* -11.528 
        (6.211) (8.080) (13.713) 
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ANC seat share Q3        -12.898* -22.083*** 1.621 
        (6.836) (8.528) (14.132) 
ANC seat share Q4        -44.830*** -87.491*** -12.857 
        (14.614) (15.294) (13.716) 
Observations 799 799 539 260 799 539 260 799 539 260 
Distribution areas in the sample All All Eskom Local All Eskom Local All Eskom Local 
R-squared 0.245 0.227 0.237 0.316 0.262 0.266 0.317 0.266 0.278 0.321 
Note: The dependent variable is the percentage share of households with electricity for lighting (difference 1996-2001) calculated from census data. 
All regressions include a constant, province fixed effects, geographic controls, population and socioeconomic controls (1996) , and households with-
out electricity (1996). Refer to Table 1 for a description of control variables, and the data appendix for full details. The pattern of results is not af-
fected when we vary the combination of controls. OLS estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Map 1: Change in household access to electricity (1996-2001) 
Map 4: ANC seat share on local councils (1996)Map 3: Share of black enfranchisement (1996)
Share of black population of voting age in 1996 (%)
0 - 25
25 - 50
50 - 65
65 - 88
88 - 100
Change in the share of households with access to electricity (%)
No change
0 - 3
3 - 10
ANC seat share (%)
0 - 15
15 - 40
40 - 65
65 - 85
85 - 100
Map 2: Share of non-white enfranchisement (1996)
Share of non-white population of voting age in 1996 (%)
0 - 70
70 - 83
83 - 90
90 - 97
97 - 100
0 500 1,000250 km
10 - 20
20 - 95
Figure 1: Geographic distribution of key variables 
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South Africa
Namibia
Botswana
Zimbabwe
Mozambique
Lesotho
Swaziland
Map 1: Raw nighttime lights raster image (1996) Map 2: Reclassified nighttime lights raster image (1996)
Lit and unlit pixels
unlit lit
Change in lit pixels (1996 - 2001)
0 - 3
3 - 10
10 - 20
20 - 95
Map 3: Share of lit pixels per municipality (1996) Map 4: Change in the share of lit pixels (1996-2001)
Share of lit pixels per municipality (1996)
0 - 10
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0 500 1,000250 km
Pixel value
Low : 0
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No change or
decrease
Figure 2: Nighttime lights as a proxy for municipal household electrifi-
cation rates 
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Figure 3: Enfranchisement conditional on ANC seat share quarter 
 
Note: Graphs (a), (b), and (c) are based on the results in columns (8), (9), and (10) of Table 4, respectively, plotted with 95% con-
fidence intervals. Q1 indicates an ANC seat share between 0-25%, Q2 above 25% and up to 50%, Q3 above 50% and up to 75%, 
and Q4 above 75% and up to 100%. 
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Supporting Information 
A. Data Appendix  
 
1. Generating a single dataset with 1995/6 election, 1996 and 
2001 census data 
Comparability problem: Although census data for 1996 and 2001 
are readily available, comparisons over time have been rare. The 
main reason for this is that the overhaul of local government during 
the 1990s fundamentally changed the geographical hierarchies rele-
vant for the censuses. For example, the 12852 so-called placenames 
(PNs) in the 1996 census were regrouped into 21243 subplaces (SPs) 
in the 2001 census.
26
 Moreover, the 813 transitional local authori-
ties
27 
that applied to the 1996 census were demarcated into 262 mu-
nicipalities prior to the 2001 census. In this process, boundaries were 
redrawn and areas were renamed. Figure A1 below shows an overlay 
of 1996 and 2001 boundaries to visualize the change in boundaries 
over time. As a consequence, the comparisons of 1996 and 2001 cen-
sus data that do exist are mostly limited to the provincial or national 
levels. 
 
                                                   
26
 The number of magisterial districts stayed constant (354), but some of the 
boundaries were redrawn. 
27
 Under apartheid, municipal structures were referred to as local government. In 
the transition period subsequent to democratization, they were termed transitional 
local authorities. Since early 2000 they are referred to as municipalities. We use 
the three terms (local government, transitional authorities, and municipalities) 
interchangeably to refer to local government entities.  
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Figure A1: Municipal demarcation (green lines indicate 1996 and 
red lines 2001 boundaries)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Overview of census data: The census data comes from the 1996 and 
2001 Community Profile and GIS databases purchased from Statis-
tics South Africa. Census 1996 variables were obtained on the mu-
nicipal level, our main level of analysis, using 1996 boundaries. Cen-
sus 2001 variables were obtained on the SP level and then aggregated 
up to the 1996 municipal level boundaries as explained below. Table 
A1 provides details on the geographical hierarchies available for 
1996 and 2001 census data. 
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Table A1: Geographical hierarchies in the 1996 and 2001  
censuses 
1996 2001 
Hierarchy Number of 
 entities 
Hierarchy Number of  
entities 
Provinces 9 Provinces 9 
District councils 45 District councils 60 
Magisterial dis-
tricts 
354 Magisterial districts 354 
Transitional local 
Authorities 
813
28
 Municipalities 262 
Placenames 12851 
Main places 3109 
Subplaces 21243 
 
Generating 2001 census data for 1996 boundaries: In order to 
obtain 2001 census data on the 1996 municipal level, we carried out 
the following steps. First, we extracted all variables based on the 
smallest geographical hierarchy in the 2001 census, i.e., 21243 SP 
units. Second, we merged this data file with the corresponding SP 
shape file in ArcGIS based on the numerical code that uniquely iden-
tifies each SP in both the shape file and the data file. Third, we as-
signed each 2001 SP to a 1996 municipality (799 polygons, also ob-
tained from the StatsSA GIS database). Fourth, we used ArcMap‟s 
spatial join analysis tool (using the option “intersect”) to assign a 
polygon from the lower geographical hierarchy to the higher level, if 
there is an intersection between the two. This method works best 
when the lower level geographical units are perfectly contained with-
in the higher-level geographical units. In the case of the South Afri-
                                                   
28
 The number of municipalities in the original shape file is 813. To see why we 
use 799 municipalities in our analysis, please refer to the discussion on “Number of 
municipalities in 1996” below.   
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can census, most SP polygons are smaller than the municipality pol-
ygons and are often fully contained within a higher-level polygon, as 
shown in Figure A2, Example 1. However, there are also several 
cases in which 2001 SPs cross the border of a 1996 municipality, as 
shown in Figure A2, Example 2. This introduces a double counting 
problem because the spatial join / intersect method adds the attributes 
of the overlapping subplace to every municipality with which the 
subplace intersects. The following explains how we address this. 
Figure A2: Overlay of geographical hierarchies (grey lines indi-
cate 1996 municipalities and red lines 2001 subplaces) 
Example 1: 2001 SPs (red) 
perfectly contained within 
1996 municipality (grey) 
Example 2: 2001 SP (red) 
overlaps with two 1996 munic-
ipalities (grey) 
               
Adjusting for overlapping SPs: In order to take overlapping or 
cross-border SPs into account (in Figure A2, Example 2), we calcu-
lated a weight based on the area size of the SP that is covered by a 
municipality. For example, if an SP has 100 individuals and 10% of 
the SP area falls within municipality A and 90% falls within munici-
pality B (i.e., the municipal boundary cuts through the SP area), then 
10 individuals will be allocated to municipality A by assigning a 
weight of 0.1 and 90 to municipality B by assigning a weight of 0.9. 
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The key underlying assumption of this method is that the population 
is evenly spread throughout the SP. Dinkelman (2011) makes the 
same assumption in her work on the effects of rural electrification on 
employment in KwaZulu-Natal. 
Election data: Municipal election results come from the Elections 
Task Group (ETG), which administered the 1995/6 local government 
elections.
29
 The ETG report is not available electronically, so we 
digitized it using photocopies from an original version held in the 
University of Cape Town Library. We then geocoded the data in 
ArcGIS by using the municipalities provided in the 1996 census 
shape file as a geo-locator. Roughly 80 per cent of municipalities 
were perfectly matched based on the names provided in the election 
report and those provided in the census shape file. The remaining 20 
per cent were matched manually.
30
 The names in the shape file were 
adjusted in correspondence with the names in the electoral report in 
order to avoid duplication during the merger. Finally, we assigned 
the electoral results to the 799 municipality polygons in the 1996 
census shape file. 
                                                   
29
 Subsequent elections have been managed by the Independent Electoral Commis-
sion, which was established as a permanent, independent institution by the 1996 
constitution. 
30
 The two main reasons for the absence of a perfect match between the names 
provided in the electoral report and the shape file are spelling discrepancies and 
duplications. For example, the electoral report provides abbreviated versions of 
long names, which do not match perfectly with the complete spelling embedded in 
the list of municipalities in the shape file. Another inconsistency between the two 
lists was that sometimes the word “rural” forms part of the name of a transitional 
council and sometimes not. Duplicates included Middelberg Transitional Rural 
Council and Middelberg Transitional Local Council, which are municipalities in 
Mpumalanga and the Eastern Cape. Richmond Transitional Local Council is the 
name of a municipality in the Northern Cape as well as in KwaZulu-Natal.  
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Number of municipalities in 1996: The number of municipalities in 
our analysis is 799. In 1993, the Local Government Transition Act 
created 843 interim local government structures. Each of these be-
longed to one of three municipal categories: metropolitan, local, or 
district council. However, in terms of both geography and local gov-
ernment representation these structures were not uniquely identified. 
For example, a district council generally included more than one mu-
nicipality. Our analysis focuses on municipalities that are uniquely 
identified in terms of both geography and representation. Our dataset 
contains 14 municipalities less than the original shape file obtained 
from StatsSA, which shows 813 municipalities. This small discrep-
ancy has various reasons. For instance, one municipality (Doringberg 
TRC) appears twice in the census shape file, i.e., it has mistakenly 
been assigned to the same polygon twice, and some entities (e.g., 
Renovaal TLC, Vierfontein TLC) do not appear as separate entries in 
the election results (Elections Task Group 1996). 
2. Description of variables  
Dependent variables:  
Electricity.  This variable is defined as the percentage share of 
households with access to electricity in a given municipality, based 
on the answer “electricity” to the census question: “What type of 
energy/fuel does this household MAINLY use for lighting?” (as per 
section B, 2.1 and H-28 in the 1996 and 2001 census household 
questionnaires respectively). We also have data on the type of energy 
used for cooking and heating, but these are inferior proxies for elec-
tricity access (Statistics South Africa 2005: 144): “In the case of 
heating and cooking, use may be limited for reasons of expense, both 
of the electricity itself and of appliances, so no conclusions can be 
drawn about access to electricity. The use of electricity for lighting, 
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however, can be taken as a proxy for access to at least some level of 
electricity.” As non-technical losses such as theft or illegal connec-
tions were widespread, it is important to note that our dependent var-
iable captures actual electricity use, not just connections and official 
users (Statistics South Africa 2005: 144). Illegal connections might 
make it difficult to attribute electrification to Eskom or municipali-
ties. Only the 1996 census distinguishes municipal and Eskom con-
nections from other connections. Less than 2% of households indi-
cated they get electricity from the latter in the 1996 census, and the 
“other connections” category was dropped from the 2001 census. 
This suggests that changes in household access to electricity between 
1996 and 2001, as captured by our key dependent variable, are over-
whelmingly attributable to Eskom and municipalities, either through 
new connections or, less likely, newly used old connections. 
Source: Statistics South Africa, 1996 and 2001 Community Profiles 
and GIS databases. 
 
Nightlight.  We define Nightlight as the percentage share of lit pixels 
in a municipality. Lit pixels are identified using satellite images of 
the earth at night collected with the Defense Meteorological Satellite 
Program‟s Operational Linescan System (DMSP-OLS) and released 
by the National Geophysical Data Center (NGDC) for the years from 
1992. We use the annual composites of cloud-free, visible, stable 
lights that are cleaned up to filter out fires and background noise to 
calculate Nightlight for the years 1992, 1996, and 2001. The calcula-
tions include the following steps, which we apply to the raw 
nighttime lights rasters for the years 1992, 1996, and 2001.
31
 First, 
we convert the stable lights image into a binary grid, where 1 repre-
                                                   
31
 In 2001 two satellites recorded nighttime lights (F14 and F15), and in this case 
we use the average of the two images. 
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sents pixels in which light is detected and 0 where no light is detect-
ed. This has the key advantage that instead of interpreting the bright-
ness of a pixel as light intensity, we use a binary variable that focuses 
on the presence or absence of light. This is important when compar-
ing images over time as the use of different satellites and thus sen-
sors to obtain nighttime light images, raises concerns about their 
comparability over time. Indeed, “satellites differ in their optical 
quality and may degrade over time” (Chen and Nordhaus 2010: 12) 
and there is no in-flight calibration of the visible band on the OLS 
(Elvidge et al. 2013: 3). We perform the binary conversion by using 
the ArcGIS reclassify tool. Note that there were no pixels with miss-
ing values in any of the years in South Africa. The resulting raster 
image is depicted in Map 2 in Figure 2 of the manuscript. Second, we 
calculate zonal statistics using the municipal boundaries shape file. 
This produces a table in which the variable “count” represents the 
number of pixels in a given municipality and the variable “sum” rep-
resents the sum of lit pixels in a given municipality. The ratio of the 
two is therefore the share of lit pixels in a municipality, which yields 
our variable nightlight (see Map 3 in Figure 2 of the manuscript).  
Source: http://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/dmsp/global_composites_v2.html 
 
An alternative method is to combine nighttime lights with population 
rasters to calculate the share of the population in lit pixels (see Elv-
idge et al. 2010). While this variable is conceptually closer to our 
census-based measure, it relies on the accuracy of population rasters.  
Main sources for population rasters are the US Department of Ener-
gy‟s Landscan data and gridded population datasets from the Center 
for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN). The 
former are based on daytime population counts using daily averages 
that capture populations on roads and other public areas. They are 
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available to us only from 2002 onwards. The latter have a resolution 
of 2.5‟ and are thus less fine-grained than the nighttime lights data. 
In our case, these data are unsuitable. In the South African context, 
daytime population counts at the local level differ substantially from 
census data due the legacy of the Group Areas Act, which under 
apartheid forced non-whites to live in designated areas often requir-
ing long commutes to work (Christopher 1994). Moreover, we lack 
such data for the time period examined here. For these reasons, we 
prefer to use only the nighttime images. 
 
Parallel trends.  As explained in the manuscript, one reason to proxy 
electrification with satellite images is that, in the absence of compa-
rable census data, they allow us to explore pre-existing trends. Here 
we report a preliminary graphical inspection of the Nightlight varia-
ble. In panel (a) of Figure A3 we divide South African municipalities 
by tertiles of Enfranchised and plot the share of lit pixels for each 
tertile during the period 1992-2001. The vertical dotted line indicates 
the year 1996. Panel (b) shows separate trend lines for the periods 
before and after 1996. For all tertiles, the increase in the share of lit 
pixels is steeper before 1996. The third tertile (high non-white popu-
lation) grows slightly more than the other two but overall trends ap-
pear very similar. After 1996, however, growth continues for the 
third tertile but much less so for the first and the second. Only re-
gression analysis can take into account confounding factors and 
properly assess the impact of pre-existing trends on our results. This 
analysis is carried out in the main empirical section and reported in 
Table 2 of the paper. 
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Figure A3: Share of lit pixels by tertiles of newly enfranchised 
voters 
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Independent variables:  
 
Enfranchised.  This variable is defined as the percentage share of 
newly enfranchised (i.e., non-white) citizens of voting age (18 or 
above) in the municipal electorate in 1996. It is derived from a cross-
tabulation of population group and age from the 1996 census. The 
variables Enfranchised black, Enfranchised coloured, and Enfran-
chised Indian are subsets of Enfranchised that capture, respectively, 
the percentage share of black, coloured, and Indian or Asian citizens 
of voting age. For the corresponding census questions see section A, 
5 and P-06 in the census household questionnaires used in 1996 and 
2001 respectively. 
Source: Statistics South Africa, 1996 and 2001 Community Profiles 
and GIS databases. 
 
ANC seat share.  This variable is defined as the percentage share of 
total seats on a given local council that were won by the African Na-
tional Congress in the 1995/6 elections. The related variables NP seat 
share and IFP seat share are defined as the percentage share of total 
seats won by the National Party and the Inkatha Freedom Party re-
spectively. 
Source: Elections Task Group (1996). 
 
Geographic controls: 
 
Elevation.  We calculate various descriptive statistics (mean, median, 
max, min, standard deviation, range) to determine the elevation of a 
given municipality. We do so by using the zonal statistics tool in 
ArcGIS and obtain elevation indicators in meters above sea level. To 
obtain these measures, we use the projected coordinate system 
“WGS 1984 UTM Zone 35S”. In our analysis, the variable elevation 
is the average municipal elevation in meters above sea level.  
Source: USGS (2004). Shuttle Radar Topography Mission, 1 
ArcSecond scene SRTM_u03_n008e004, Unfilled Unfinished 2.0, 
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Global Land Cover Facility, University of Maryland, College Park, 
Maryland, February 2000. 
 
Slope.  In order to calculate the slope of a given municipality, we 
perform a surface analysis in ArcGIS and generate a new raster layer. 
We apply the zonal statistics tool to this raster, using the municipali-
ty shape file and thus calculate various descriptive statistics (mean, 
median, max, min, standard deviation, range) of slope in percent rise. 
These calculations are performed using the projected coordinate sys-
tem “WGS 1984 UTM Zone 35S”. 
Source: USGS (2004). Shuttle Radar Topography Mission, 1 
ArcSecond scene SRTM_u03_n008e004, Unfilled Unfinished 2.0, 
Global Land Cover Facility, University of Maryland, College Park, 
Maryland, February 2000. 
 
Distance from electricity grid.  This variable measures the shortest 
distance in kilometers between the centroid of a municipality and the 
South African high-voltage power grid in 1996. This measure is cal-
culated using the proximity tool in ArcGIS 10 using the municipality 
shape file and power grid shape file, containing the geo-referenced 
high-voltage Eskom power lines in South Africa in 1996. 
Source: Eskom (1997). Annual Report 1996. Johannesburg, Eskom. 
 
Distance from main road.  This variable measures the shortest dis-
tance in kilometers between the centroid of a municipality and the 
closest main road in 1996. This measure is calculated using the prox-
imity tool in ArcGIS 10 using the municipality shape file and the 
shape file of main roads in 1996 included in the 1996 GIS database. 
Source: Statistics South Africa, 1996 GIS databases. 
 
Population controls: 
  
Population density.  We calculate this variable by dividing the total 
population in a given municipality, using 1996 and 2001 census data, 
by the area of that municipality measured in square kilometers. The 
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area is calculated using the area tool in ArcGIS 10 using the 1996 
municipality shape file. 
Source: Statistics South Africa, 1996 and 2001 Community Profiles 
and GIS databases. 
 
Number of households.  This variable is the number of households 
living in a given municipality in 1996. 
Source: Statistics South Africa, 1996 Community Profile. 
 
Number of non-electrified households.  This variable is defined as the 
number of households without access to electricity in a given munic-
ipality. It counts the number of households in a municipality that do 
not answer “electricity” to the census question “What type of ener-
gy/fuel does this household MAINLY use for lighting?” (see section 
B, 2.1 in the 1996 census household questionnaire). 
Source: Statistics South Africa, 1996 Community Profile. 
 
Socioeconomic controls: 
 
Share of population with no schooling.  This variable is the number 
of people aged five years or more with no schooling as a percentage 
of the total population aged five years or more in a given municipali-
ty. For the census questions corresponding to schooling see section 
A, 16.1 and P-17 in the census household questionnaires in 1996 and 
2001 respectively. 
Source: Statistics South Africa, 1996 and 2001 Community Profiles. 
 
Median income.  This is the median household income in South Afri-
can Rand (ZAR) in 1996 (nominal) and 2001 (real). Figures for the 
two years were made comparable by inflation-adjusting the 2001 
data using the Consumer Price Index (CPI). CPI base 2008 (i.e., 
equal to 100 in 2008) is 48.6 in 1996 and 66.1 in 2001, so we deflate 
2001 income by dividing by 1.36. For the census questions corre-
sponding to income see section A, 20 and P-22 in the census house-
hold questionnaires in 1996 and 2001 respectively. 
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Source: Statistics South Africa, 1996 and 2001 Community Profiles. 
 
Share of labor force with low income.  This variable is the share of 
individuals in the labor force earning less than 500 ZAR in 1996. 
Since data is grouped in earning ranges and the two census rounds 
use different groupings, it was not possible to match 1996 and 2001 
figures. Hence, we can use the 1996 level variable in our regressions, 
but not the 1996-2001 difference. For the census questions corre-
sponding to income see section A, 20 and P-22 in the census house-
hold questionnaires in 1996 and 2001 respectively. 
Source: Statistics South Africa, 1996 Community Profiles. 
 
3. Distinguishing Eskom and municipal electricity distribution 
areas 
 
According to the Department of Minerals and Energy (2001: 5), 
“there were approximately 450 municipalities distributing electricity 
in 1991, but the number has reduced to fewer than 250 as a result of 
the rationalisation of local authorities after 1994.” In 1995, the Na-
tional Electricity Regulator (NER 2000: 93) granted temporary dis-
tribution licenses to 362 municipalities. About a quarter of these 
made losses from their distribution of electricity and lacked the 
means for large-scale electrification (Department of Minerals and 
Energy 1998: 43). To identify areas in which Eskom would be likely 
to directly carry out electrification projects, we obtained the 1996 
membership list from the Association of Municipal Electricity Un-
dertakings (AMEU). For each member, the list provides the address 
and name of the head of the electricity department of a municipality. 
We use this information to approximate a split into municipal and 
Eskom distribution areas. Where the AMEU list indicates that a city 
or town had its own electricity department, we code the relevant 
Metropolitan Local Council (MLC) or Transitional Local Council 
(TLC) as having municipal distribution. In addition, we code any 
Transitional Rural Council (TRC) with the same name as a TLC 
identified from the AMEU list as having municipal distribution, 
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since “many [municipal distributors] also distribute electricity in 
adjacent rural areas” (Department of Minerals and Energy 2001: 5), 
which makes them less likely to have to rely on Eskom. For instance, 
Stellenbosch is on the AMEU list, so in our dataset both Stellenbosch 
TLC and Stellenbosch TRC are coded as having municipal distribu-
tion. We also make a small number of municipality-specific coding 
decisions. The Lowveld and Escarpment Regional Services Council 
(later District Council) is on the AMEU list. It provided services in-
cluding electricity to and on behalf of a number of municipalities, 
several of which have separate entries on the AMEU list. We code all 
municipalities that fall under it as having municipal distribution, as 
they did not have to rely on Eskom for electrification. Uitenhage, 
too, is on the AMEU list, and we code it as part of the municipal dis-
tribution sample. Here, Eskom was involved in electrification, but 
through a joint venture with the local authority (Qase et al. 2001). 
These choices are based on our best judgment about the degree of 
municipal accountability for electrification. The pattern of results 
that we report does not change when we code these observations dif-
ferently, or drop them from the analysis. Our estimate is that munici-
pal distributors were responsible for electrification in 260 munici-
palities in our dataset. 
 
B. Appendix: Other Tables and Figures 
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Table B1: Descriptive statistics for municipality dataset 
 
 a. All observations (N = 799) b. Enfranchised non-white < 86.65 (N = 399) c. Enfranchised non-white ≥ 86.65 (N = 400) 
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min Max Mean Std. dev. Min Max Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
ΔElectricity 9.1 19.1 -54.1 95.5 3.7 14.7 -54.1 60.2 14.6 21.3 -42.8 95.5 
ΔNightlight 2.4 12.1 -36.7 100.0 1.2 9.7 -30.0 100.0 3.6 14.0 -36.7 100.0 
Electricity 
(1996) 
63.1 27.0 0.0 100.0 74.0 19.8 6.2 100.0 52.3 28.8 0.0 100.0 
Nightlight 
(1996) 
62.9 39.2 0.0 100.0 71.5 38.3 0.0 100.0 54.4 38.4 0.0 100.0 
Electricity 
(2001) 
72.3 20.0 0.5 100.0 77.7 16.5 21.2 100.0 66.9 21.7 0.5 100.0 
Nightlight 
(2001) 
65.4 38.2 0.0 100.0 72.7 37.7 0.0 100.0 58.1 37.3 0.0 100.0 
Enfranchised 82.2 18.5 0.0 100.0 69.8 18.8 0.0 86.6 94.6 4.8 86.7 100.0 
Enfranchised 
black 
57.2 36.3 0.0 100.0 40.5 30.7 0.0 86.0 73.9 33.6 0.0 100.0 
Enfranchised 
coloured 
22.9 31.5 0.0 99.2 26.8 30.1 0.0 84.2 19.0 32.4 0.0 99.2 
Enfranchised 
Indian 
1.4 6.5 0.0 87.6 1.6 5.8 0.0 53.9 1.1 7.1 0.0 87.6 
ANC seat share 54.7 31.0 0.0 100.0 40.7 26.6 0.0 100.0 68.7 28.8 0.0 100.0 
NP seat share 17.9 24.0 0.0 100.0 25.2 26.1 0.0 100.0 10.7 19.3 0.0 100.0 
IFP seat share 1.5 8.6 0.0 100.0 1.5 7.5 0.0 71.4 1.5 9.7 0.0 100.0 
Distance from 
electricity grid 
(1996) 
49.2 46.5 0.1 266.7 39.7 33.5 0.1 211.5 58.8 54.9 0.4 266.7 
Distance from 
main road (1996) 
19.5 23.1 0.0 201.4 18.0 23.2 0.0 134.0 20.9 22.9 0.0 201.4 
Slope 1.4 0.9 0.2 4.9 1.3 0.9 0.2 4.9 1.4 0.9 0.2 4.1 
Elevation 970.8 530.4 5.2 2061.6 891.9 583.0 5.2 1899.0 1049.5 459.6 24.1 2061.6 
Number of 10367.2 26375.7 4.0 265111.0 10446.7 29086.4 4.0 239313.0 10287.8 23397.5 52.0 265111.0 
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households 
(1996) 
Population 
density (1996) 
3797.1 17951.4 0.3 233598.8 4730.9 19378.3 0.3 233598.8 2865.7 16376.4 3.4 226593.5 
Share of popula-
tion with no 
schooling (1996) 
20.7 12.7 0.0 77.6 16.7 12.1 0.0 77.6 24.7 12.1 1.3 61.7 
Low income 
(1996) 
38.6 18.7 0.0 96.1 34.2 19.4 0.0 90.1 42.9 16.8 8.1 96.1 
Median income 
(1996) 
16340.0 28281.5 0.0 360000.0 24228.0 37846.7 2079.0 360000.0 8471.7 6827.7 0.0 41927.8 
Households 
without electrici-
ty (1996) 
4074.0 9136.6 0.0 72214.0 2325.8 5949.1 0.0 50579.0 5817.7 11204.8 0.0 72214.0 
ΔNumber of 
households 
3663.1 16286.2 -21450.7 267563.1 4029.7 19272.3 -21450.7 267563.1 3297.3 12638.0 -6731.8 127569.1 
ΔPopulation 
density 
2503.8 8862.0 -4700.5 88052.7 3005.0 9449.7 -4700.5 79469.7 2003.9 8215.6 -503.6 88052.7 
ΔShare of 
population with 
no schooling 
-2.0 6.2 -43.6 30.9 -2.0 6.3 -43.6 30.9 -1.9 6.1 -26.8 28.9 
ΔMedian income 1001.3 25576.9 -355473.3 89634.6 -107.8 35689.1 -355473.3 89634.6 2107.6 5948.4 -23443.5 24200.7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2016/05 
68 
 
Table B2: Descriptive statistics for contiguous census tracts dataset 
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
ΔElectricity 12.7 25.6 -87.7 99.9 
Enfranchised 86.5 13.4 0.0 100.0 
Enfranchised black 69.7 31.0 0.0 100.0 
Enfranchised coloured 11.4 22.6 0.0 99.2 
Enfranchised Indian 4.8 14.1 0.0 87.6 
Distance from electricity grid (1996) 53.8 53.4 0.0 214.4 
Distance from main road (1996) 16.6 18.5 0.0 134.0 
Slope 1.7 1.1 0.1 5.9 
Elevation 954.5 533.5 3.4 2209.5 
Number of households (1996) 2155.2 4247.9 1.0 83051.0 
Population density (1996) 6907.1 27722.4 0.0 571911.4 
Share of population with no schooling (1996) 9.9 8.5 0.0 63.2 
Low income (1996) 40.4 23.8 0.0 100.0 
Median income (1996) 27365.5 53294.6 0.0 360000.0 
Households without electricity (1996) 925.8 1729.8 0.0 29857.0 
ΔNumber of households 1712.0 4354.2 -7203.9 38908.8 
ΔPopulation density 27185.4 83197.2 -226811.2 1627336.0 
ΔShare of population with no schooling 13.0 12.0 -29.6 76.1 
ΔMedian income -6729.9 49655.9 -360000.0 134198.3 
Note: N = 7530. 
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Table B3: Robustness to excluding municipalities with high levels of electrification in 1996 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
a. Direct effects       
Enfranchised 0.375*** 0.475*** 0.522*** 0.658*** 0.905*** 0.813*** 
 (0.063) (0.093) (0.110) (0.132) (0.233) (0.278) 
b. Conditional effects       
Enfranchised 0.130 0.239* 0.299* 0.474** 0.558 0.488 
 (0.081) (0.134) (0.152) (0.186) (0.396) (0.434) 
ANC seat share -0.535*** -0.370* -0.376* -0.118 -0.439 -0.435 
 (0.142) (0.214) (0.219) (0.280) (0.485) (0.589) 
Enfranchised  ANC seat share 0.006*** 0.005* 0.005* 0.002 0.005 0.005 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) 
Including municipalities with 1996 levels of electrification < 90 80 70 60 50 40 
Observations 667 517 405 308 237 181 
Note: The dependent variable is the percentage share of households with electricity (difference 1996-2001) calculated from 
census data. All regressions include a constant, province fixed effects, geographic controls, population and socioeconomic 
controls (1996), and households without electricity (1996). Refer to Table 1 for a description of control variables, and the data 
appendix for full details. The pattern of results is not affected when we vary the combination of controls. OLS estimates with 
robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table B4: Robustness to excluding municipalities in individual provinces 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
a. Direct effects          
Enfranchised 0.160*** 0.182*** 0.177*** 0.204*** 0.208*** 0.167*** 0.180*** 0. 184*** 0.255*** 
 (0.044) (0.042) (0.040) (0.043) (0.039) (0.043) (0.043) (0.042) (0.048) 
b. Conditional effects          
Enfranchised 0.084* 0.070 0.041 0.035 0.049 0.034 0.028 0.054 0.104* 
 (0.050) (0.044) (0.043) (0.044) (0.043) (0.045) (0.048) (0.045) (0.058) 
ANC seat share -0.218** -0.366*** -0.397*** -0.367*** -0.450*** -0.350*** -0.358*** -0.396*** -0.379*** 
 (0.088) (0.091) (0.086) (0.090) (0.097) (0.089) (0.089) (0.098) (0.100) 
Enfranchised  ANC seat share 0.003** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Sample excluding EC FS GP KZN MP NW NC NP WC 
Observations 623 704 754 732 722 746 693 747 671 
Note: The dependent variable is the percentage share of households with electricity (difference 1996-2001) calculated from cen-
sus data. Province abbreviations: EC = Eastern Cape, FS = Free State, GP = Gauteng Province, KZN = KwaZulu-Natal, MP = 
Mpumalanga, NW = North West, NC = Northern Cape, NP = Northern Province / Limpopo, WC = Western Cape. All regres-
sions include a constant, province fixed effects, geographic controls, population and socioeconomic controls (1996), and house-
holds without electricity (1996). Refer to Table 1 for a description of control variables, and the data appendix for full details. The 
pattern of results is not affected when we vary the combination of controls. OLS estimates with robust standard errors in paren-
theses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Figure B1: Overview of South Africa’s census geography in 1996 
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Figure B2: Coefficients on province fixed effects 
 
 
Note: The graph complements the results in column (5) of Table 1 and reports the coefficient on each province fixed effect 
with 95% confidence intervals. EC = Eastern Cape, FS = Free State, GP = Gauteng Province, KZN = KwaZulu-Natal, MP 
= Mpumalanga, NW = North West, NC = Northern Cape, NP = Northern Province / Limpopo, WC = Western Cape. 
LIEPP Working Paper n° 53 
73 
Figure B3: Conditional effect with alternative measures of partisan representation 
 
 
 
Note: The first graph is based on the results in column (5) of Table 4, plotted with 95% confidence intervals. The following two 
graphs show the results when we replace the ANC‟s seat share with that of the NP and the IFP, respectively, and run an otherwise 
identical model. 
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